Phila Indemnity Ins v. Healy by unknown
2005 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-21-2005 
Phila Indemnity Ins v. Healy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 
Recommended Citation 
"Phila Indemnity Ins v. Healy" (2005). 2005 Decisions. 68. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/68 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, District Judge for the United States District Court*
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
1
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
Nos. 04-4780 and 05-1115
__________
PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
ANDREA A. HEALY, an individual;
EARL M. EASTERLING, an individual;
JACQUELINE MCGOVERN, an individual;
CHRISTOPHER MCGOVERN, an individual
Appellants
__________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-6170
District Judge: The Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise
_________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 16, 2005
_________
Before: BARRY and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,  District Judge.*
_________
(Opinion Filed: December 21, 2005)
  A default judgment had previously been entered against Healy and Easterling in Phila’s1
declaratory judgment action, as they failed to timely answer Phila’s complaint.  Having later
granted Phila’s motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, the District
Court denied Healy and Easterling’s motion to set aside the default judgment because they could
offer no meritorious defense (i.e. – there was no point in vacating the default judgment given that
summary judgment would be rendered against them in any event).  Because the merit of the
motion to set aside default depends entirely on the propriety of summary judgment, we will






This is a consolidated appeal from an order of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey in which the court granted summary judgment to Philadelphia
Indemnity Insurance Company (“Phila”) in its suit for a declaration that it was not
obligated to indemnify appellants Andrea Healy (“Healy”) and Earl Easterling
(“Easterling”) in connection with personal injury claims asserted against them by
appellants Jacqueline and Christopher McGovern (“the McGoverns”).  1
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only those facts and aspects
of the procedural history that are of particular pertinence to our analysis.  We note that the
District Court order being appealed was accompanied by a thorough opinion, and we refer
the parties to that opinion’s description of the background facts for detail lacking here. 
 “A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or2
vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by
auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results. . . .”  N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:12-1c(1).
3
For purposes of our opinion, the following will suffice.  
Healy, Easterling, and the McGoverns were involved in an altercation in the
parking lot of an amusement park.  During this altercation, Healy drove a van into Mrs.
McGovern, pinning her against another vehicle and causing her serious injury.  Healy was
arrested in connection with the incident, and, while Healy and the McGoverns have
always disputed whether Healy acted intentionally in driving the van into Mrs.
McGovern, it is not disputed that Healy ultimately pled guilty to fourth degree assault by
auto  and served a one-year prison term.2
The McGoverns instituted a personal injury suit against Healy and Easterling in
state court, and that suit was the impetus for the insurance dispute on which this appeal is
based.  The vehicle Healy drove into Mrs. McGovern was a van Healy had rented from a
car rental agency.  In connection with the rental, Healy entered a rental agreement that
provided for primary auto liability insurance coverage and also contained the following
clause: “USE RESTRICTIONS: The Vehicle will not be used or operated by anyone. . .
during the commission of a felony. . . .”  Healy also purchased a Supplemental Liability
Insurance Excess Policy (“LIS Policy”) in the amount of $1 million, and this policy,
underwritten by Phila, is the subject of this appeal.  The LIS Policy contains the following
exclusion: “‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the use, or permitting the
4use, of a ‘rental vehicle’. . . when such use is in violation of the conditions of the ‘rental
agreement.’”  A brochure describing the LIS Policy contains the following statement:
“The program contains exclusions. . . .  Some of the LIS exclusions are the same as those
found in most automobile liability insurance policies.  The following additional
exclusions are brought to your attention since they are not customarily found in
automobile insurance policies, but are contained in the excess automobile insurance
liability policies, and therefore in LIS:  1. There is no protection if you or any Authorized
Driver use or permit the use of the rental vehicle in violation of the terms of the Rental
Agreement.”
Considering the “felony exclusion” effected by the interplay of the rental
agreement and the LIS Policy to be unambiguous, and finding no genuine issue of
material fact regarding Healy’s use of the rental van to commit a felony, the District Court
decided the claims asserted by the McGoverns against Healy were excluded from
coverage by the LIS Policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Phila.
Healy, Easterling, and the McGoverns appeal the District Court’s order.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over Phila’s declaratory judgment action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and this court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. 
5Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp.,
Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 566 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is proper if there is no
genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
III.
A.
Healy and Easterling’s primary argument on appeal is that the LIS Policy
exclusion is ambiguous and should therefore be construed in their favor.  They point out
that the exclusion refers to violation of “conditions” of the rental agreement, while the
only provision of the rental agreement that mentions commission of a felony is in a
section denominated “use restrictions.”  They indicate the term “conditions” in the LIS
Policy exclusion is not clearly defined and argue it is not clear that the term includes “use
restrictions.”
Phila urges that this argument was not properly preserved for appeal, and, in any
event, we find no merit in it.  Under New Jersey law, the words of an insurance policy
should be given their plain, ordinary meaning.  Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 775 A.2d
1262, 1264 (N.J. 2001).  While insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, and therefore
ambiguities are construed against the drafting party, courts should not engage in a
 Both the Merriam-Webster Online Thesaurus and the Merriam-Webster Online3
Dictionary are available on the internet at http://www.m-w.com.
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strained construction of a policy to find ambiguity.  Id.; Gibson v. Callaghan, 730 A.2d
1278, 1282 (N.J. 1999); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 765 A.2d 195, 201-02 (N.J.
2001).  One acceptable method of determining the plain, ordinary meaning of a word in
an insurance policy is by referring to a dictionary or thesaurus.  Boddy v. Cigna Prop. &
Cas. Cos., 760 A.2d 823, 827 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2000).
We are satisfied Phila has met its burden of demonstrating that the “felony
exlusion” of the LIS Policy is unambiguous and enforceable.  See Gibson, 730 A.2d at
1283.  As Phila points out, the Merriam-Webster Online Thesaurus provides the
following synonyms and related words for the term “condition:” “provision,” “terms,”
“limitation,” and “restriction.”  The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary  defines the3
word “condition” as “a premise upon which the fulfillment of an agreement depends” or
“a restricting or modifying factor.”  Moreover, as a simple matter of common usage, we
consider Healy and Easterling’s contention – that the term  “use restriction” in the rental
agreement falls outside the scope of the term “condition” in the LIS Policy exclusion –
facially unconvincing.  Finally, we note that the brochure accompanying the LIS Policy
also indicated violation of the “terms” of the rental agreement would preclude coverage;
difficult as it is for us to imagine that an ordinary reader would not consider “use
restrictions” to be “conditions,” it is all the more difficult to conceive that a reader might
fail to recognize that at least one of the words, “conditions” or “terms,” embodies “use
7restrictions.”  We conclude that the supposed ambiguity in the LIS Policy exclusion is not
“genuine,” as the policy is not “so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make
out the boundaries of coverage.”  See Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 795
(N.J. 1979).  We read the LIS Policy to exclude coverage for violation of the rental
agreement’s “use restrictions,” one of which is use of the rented vehicle during
commission of a felony.
B.
The next step in our inquiry is to determine whether Healy did in fact violate a
“use restriction” of the rental agreement by using the vehicle during the commission of a
felony.
In connection with this inquiry, Healy proffers an argument similar to that
addressed above – that is, she asserts the term “felony” in the rental agreement is
ambiguous, that it does not clearly include the offense to which she pled guilty, and that
the term should be construed in her favor.  
Once again, we are not persuaded that there is any relevant ambiguity in the rental
agreement or LIS Policy.  The term “felony” is not defined in the rental agreement or LIS
Policy, and New Jersey does not use the traditional felony/misdemeanor nomenclature in
its criminal code.  However, the term “felony” has been defined by New Jersey courts as
an offense punishable by more than one year in prison.  State v. Doyle, 200 A.2d 606, 614
 “Insurers may exclude a person from benefits under sections 4 and 10 of P.L.1972, c. 704
(C.39:6A-4 and 39:6A-10), medical expense benefits provided in section 4 of P.L.1998, c. 21
(C.39:6A-3.1), and benefits provided in section 45 of P.L.2003, c.89 (C.39:6A-3.3), if that
person's conduct contributed to his personal injuries or death occurred in any of the following
ways: (1) while committing a high misdemeanor or felony or seeking to avoid lawful
apprehension or arrest by a police officer. . . .”
8
(N.J. 1964).  Healy’s conviction of the fourth degree offense assault by auto was
punishable by up to 18 months in prison, and the District Court therefore concluded that
Healy’s offense was a felony.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6a(4).  Healy attacks the
District Court’s reliance on Doyle by pointing out that it was decided under a different
penal code than is now in place in New Jersey and that it had nothing to do with insurance
exclusions.  However, Healy fails to cite any New Jersey case in which a different
definition of the term “felony” was used.  In order to sustain her claim of ambiguity,
Healy must at least offer an alternative plausible meaning for the supposedly ambiguous
term, but she fails to do so.  Healy also fails to recognize that New Jersey courts have
adopted the Doyle definition of a felony in insurance exclusion cases.  Kaplowitz v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493 A.2d 637, 639-40 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 1985); Serio v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 509 A.2d 273, 277 n.1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986).  Finally, we note
that the New Jersey legislature has itself crafted an allowable auto insurance exclusion
based on an insured’s criminal conduct, and the statute uses the term “felony” in defining
the exclusion.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-7a(1) .  We are reluctant to fault an insurance4
company for drafting an insurance exclusion using the same terminology adopted by the
9state legislature in a similar context.  Given all the above, we conclude that the term
“felony,” as used in the rental agreement and incorporated by reference into the LIS
Policy: 1) is unambiguous, and 2) refers to an offense punishable by more than one year
in prison. 
IV.
The McGoverns’ primary contention on appeal is that Healy’s guilty plea to assault
by auto in a criminal proceeding does not conclusively establish she committed that
offense for purposes of this civil proceeding.  While the body of New Jersey case law on
this point is not a seamless web, we find that it offers greater support to the District
Court’s conclusion than to the McGoverns’ position.
The basic rule that emerges from the New Jersey cases is that a criminal conviction
is conclusive proof of commission of a crime, but not of the underlying facts.  Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Schmitt, 570 A.2d 488, 495 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1990); State v. Gonzalez,
641 A.2d 1060, 1062 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1994).  The McGoverns cite the following
cases for the proposition that a conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea is not given
preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation: Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7
(N.J. 1970); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kollar, 578 A.2d 1238 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1990); Garden State Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keefe, 410 A.2d 718 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1980); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Connolly, 852 A.2d 227 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
10
2004); and Kaplowitz, supra.  We note at the outset that Kollar, Keefe, and Burd are
readily distinguishable from the case at bar, as the holdings in those cases were limited to
the following proposition: a person who has pled guilty to a crime should be permitted to
litigate his intent in a subsequent civil proceeding.  These holdings each applied the
qualification on the rule cited above by refusing to accept a guilty plea as conclusive
proof of intent, an issue of fact underlying the crime.  These cases tell us nothing,
however, about the body of the rule – that a guilty plea does conclusively establish that
the defendant committed the crime – on which the District Court relied.  Connolly is also
distinguishable, though its holding seems to bear more closely on the rule applied by the
District Court in this case.  In Connolly, the court permitted a litigant who had previously
pled guilty to an assaultive offense to dispute, in a subsequent civil proceeding, that he
was even present at the scene of the crime.  While one’s absence from the crime scene
clearly suggests he did not commit the crime at all, we think Connolly’s holding is still
correctly conceptualized only as one that refuses to give a guilty plea preclusive effect as
to the facts underlying the crime.  Whether the Connolly court fully recognized the
implications of its holding on the facts before it is not clear, but there is no language in
Connolly to suggest the court intended to establish a new rule that guilty pleas are not
conclusive proof of commission of the crime.  Indeed, the Connolly court did not even
cite, let alone attempt to distinguish, Schmitt, which, as further discussed below, explicitly
held the opposite – guilty pleas are conclusive proof that the defendant committed the
 The exclusion also requires a showing that the injury for which exclusion is sought was5
inflicted “during” commission of the felony, but there is no dispute in this case that Ms.
McGovern’s injuries were sustained during Healy’s commission of assault by auto.
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crime.  
We also note one critical characteristic common to each of the above cases – the
insurance exclusion at issue was an exclusion for injuries either expected or intended by
the insured.  In order to apply this exclusion, the insurer was required to demonstrate
something more than mere conviction of a crime; it had to prove some underlying facts
about the crime in order to establish intent.  This is not so in the case currently before us. 
The exclusion Phila attempts to apply in this case requires only that it demonstrate
commission of a felony by the insured .  No showing regarding the underlying facts is5
required.
One final case cited by the McGoverns, Kaplowitz, is also distinguishable.  The
court in that case noticed an aberration in the plea proceeding at issue in that case – the
juvenile court that accepted the guilty plea evidently did not require demonstration of a
factual basis for the plea.  It is understandable that the civil court would be reluctant to
give the plea preclusive effect under such circumstances, circumstances that are not
present in this case.  In any event, we also note that Kaplowitz was decided by a New
Jersey trial court in 1985, and to the extent it is inconsistent with Schmitt (which will be
discussed in the next paragraph), Schmitt governs because it was decided more recently
by a higher court. 
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Schmitt, supra, is the one New Jersey case we have found that bears directly on the
issue under consideration here.  Unlike the bulk of the cases cited by the McGoverns,
Schmitt dealt with an insurance exclusion based on commission of a crime.  The Schmitt
court stated the previously cited rule in full: “Although a conviction may or may not be
conclusive evidence of the underlying facts, it is to be accorded preclusive effect with
respect to the insured’s commission of the crime.” 570 A.2d at 495.  It then applied that
rule in a context similar to that presented in this case and unlike that presented in any case
cited by the McGoverns, holding the insured’s guilty plea to be conclusive proof that he
committed the crime for which exclusion was sought.  The court therefore affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the insurer based on the criminal exclusion.  The
McGoverns advance no argument and cite no case offering a persuasive ground for
concluding that Schmitt should not control our decision in the case at bar.  To the
contrary, our examination of the New Jersey case law leads us to conclude that Schmitt
states the proper legal rule to be applied in this case, and the District Court correctly
reached the conclusion dictated by that rule. 
The McGoverns offer one final argument for reversal of the District Court’s
judgment.  They argue the felony exclusion contravenes public policy and should be
declared per se invalid.  This is a thinly supported claim backed up by one out-of-state
case and half a paragraph of discussion.  We find no merit in it.  While the New Jersey
courts have not yet passed on this precise question, we have difficulty believing they
13
would agree with the McGoverns given the settled New Jersey case law that auto
insurance policy exclusions for intentionally inflicted injuries, as well as homeowner’s
policy exclusions for injuries caused by the insured’s criminal recklessness, are consistent
with public policy.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 514 A.2d 832 (N.J. 1986); Schmitt, 570
A.2d at 493-94.  The McGoverns cite no case suggesting that New Jersey courts would
agree with their argument, and, given the existing case law that points the other way, we
think it would be quite inappropriate for federal courts to expand the public policy of that
state, the construction of whose laws is the paramount responsibility of its own judiciary,
to a point that no New Jersey court has suggested it reach.
V.
In conclusion, we find the LIS Policy exclusion of liabilities resulting from
violation of the conditions of the rental agreement to be unambiguous and enforceable. 
One of the rental agreement’s conditions is the “use restriction” prohibiting use of the
rental vehicle during commission of a felony.  We also find the rental agreement’s use of
the term “felony” to be unambiguous and to refer to any offense punishable by more than
one year in prison.  Furthermore, we conclude Healy used the rented vehicle during
commission of such an offense, as we agree with the District Court that Healy’s guilty
plea to fourth degree assault by auto, which is punishable by up to 18 months in prison,
conclusively establishes, for purposes of this civil action, that she committed that offense. 
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Because there is no dispute that Healy pled guilty to a felony in connection with her use
of the rental van, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding her commission of
that crime.  Finally, we see nothing in the LIS Policy “felony exclusion” that offends the
public policy of the state of New Jersey.  These findings compel the conclusion that Phila
had no duty to indemnify Healy for the tort claims asserted against her by the McGoverns
in state court, and hence that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of Phila.  We will therefore affirm.
